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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PROCON CORPORATION,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
vs.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

i

Case No. 920758-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant, Utah Department of Transportation,
(UDOT) submits this Reply Brief in response to Plaintiff/Appellee
Procon Corporation's (Procon) Brief of Appellee.

The majority of

Procon's arguments raised in its brief are addressed in UDOT's
original brief.

UDOT disagrees with Procon's arguments

concerning notice as purportedly communicated to UDOT by Exhibit
18-P, and Procon's attempts to justify the Court's erroneous
decision to admit said exhibit into evidence.

UDOT further

disagrees with Procon's arguments concerning the application of
the Thorn case, waiver of the notice requirement and lack of
prejudice.

This reply brief responds to Procon's arguments in

those areas.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

UDOT has in fact martialed all the evidence

that relates to the Finding of Fact by the Court that UDOT was on
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notice that Procon intended to seek added compensation for moving
of the waste disposal area and it fails to support the said
finding.

The only evidence is the letter of April 14, 1986

(Exhibit 18-P) and it should have been excluded since the
evidence before the Court is that it was not received by UDOT.
Point II. Procon's assertion that the case of Thorn
Construction Company v. UDOT is controlling in this case is
incorrect.

In Thorn there was a verbal directive by the Engineer

which directed the performance of added work.

The Engineer in

that case knew that it involved work beyond that specified in the
plans.

In this case a field change was made by the Engineer

which he did not consider to be a material or compensible change.
Point III. UDOT was prejudiced by the lack of notice
contrary to Procon's assertion.

UDOT did not waive its right to

assert lack of notice by considering Procon's claim.

As soon as

the Engineer became aware of the letter, he pointed out the fact
that he had not seen the letter and was totally unaware of the
fact that Procon had any concern about the way in which the waste
material was to be placed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UDOT HAS MARTIALED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORE) WHICH RELATES TO NOTICE OF PROCON'S
INTENT TO CLAIM ADDED PAYMENT AND IT FAILS TO
SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT UDOT WAS ON
NOTICE OF SUCH INTENT.
Under Point I of its brief, Procon asserts that UDOT
has failed to marshall the evidence which supports the findings
2
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I

of the trial court.

Despite the fact that Procon cites numerous

authorities which describe what is required of UDOT and what the
appellate court can and cannot do, they fail to cite any
specifics to support the said allegation as to Point 1 of UDOT's
brief.

Under Point II of its brief, Procon in sub-section A

attempts to defend the Court's finding that UDOT was notified by
Procon that it intended to claim added compensation due to a
change in the waste area.

Their argument is essentially a

recitation of factual events which they argue constitute a change
in the location of the waste area and how it affects Procon.

The

Court's finding that UDOT was on "notice" is Finding of Fact
Number 21. None of the detail which Procon has laid out in its
brief about the change in the waste area location is set out in
the letter of April 14, 1986 (Exhibit 18-P), which is the only
evidence in the course of the construction which deals with
notice.

Contract provisions provide that if the contractor is

required to do something by the Engineer which is contrary to the
plans, and the contractor intends to seek added payment as a
result, that the contractor must notify the owner in writing.
(Exhibit 5P, Sec. 104.02)

The notification also must show how

the direction or change will adversely affect the contractor and
is supposed to be served before the contractor does the work.
This then gives the owner the opportunity to either reverse the
direction, to negotiate with the contractor over the price of the
change, or it gives the owner a chance to keep records of the
3
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effort as to time and equipment.

In some cases it gives the

owner a chance to decide to terminate the contract for the
owner's convenience.
UDOT does not deny that the waste material was placed
in a location east of the exact location specified on the plans
for the waste area itself.

The plans also provide for a slope

that is required for fills at the specified angle of two feet
horizontal to one foot in elevation.

The engineer calculated and

caused stakes to be placed for the required slope. All of the
waste material placed on this project is encompassed within this
slope angle (R. 652, 653) . Apparently the design engineer forgot
to include the area of the slope in the specified waste area
location.
field.

Changes of this nature are a common occurence in the

Most of the time such changes are ignored unless the

contractor feels they are to his disadvantage or the engineer
recognizes that the change will adversely affect the contractor
in which case some agreement regarding compensation is usually
worked out at the time.
The plans required the roadway to be widened as it
emerges from a cut. The contractor had to access the bottom of
the fill by means of a roadway which he had to construct down
slope to the east in order to construct the fill from the bottom
up so that it could be compacted.

In the judgment of the

engineer it was just as easy to place waste material adjacent to
the roadway fill as it was to place it in the exact location
4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

specified by the plans (R. 685-686).

The linear distance was

some 300 feet greater for some of the material. A slope was
required in any event to support the material wherever it was
located, so the location of the slope was staked to coincide with
the widened fill (R. 652,653,658,666-671).
The argument UDOT has made in its opening brief and
which is reiterated here is that it was never notified during the
performance of the work that Procon considered that it was
adversely affected by the adjustment in the location of the waste
material.

Nothing cited in Procon's brief supports the Court's

finding that UDOT was so notified.

The letter of April 14, 1986

(Exhibit 18-P) is the only possible evidence of notice.
UDOT has already marshalled all the evidence that is
before the Court that could possibly support finding of fact
number 21. The letter would no doubt constitute notice
sufficient to put UDOT on notice that Procon had concern about
the change in placement of waste material if it had been received
by UDOT.

The evidence before the trial judge simply fails to

establish that UDOT ever received notice, either in writing or
verbally during the performance of the work (R.657-659).

There

is no evidence in the record that the Engineer reacted to the
letter by discussing the matter of added payment with Procon, or
that he had discussion with anyone concerning the waste area
staking, or that he gave direction to his inspector personnel to
keep records of Procon's effort to move waste material, or any
5
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other indicator which would support the fact that UDOT ever in
fact received the letter.

The Engineer stated he did not see the

letter until several years later during trial preparation and
that he had searched the project file and did not find the letter
therein (R.657).

Procon fails to cite any conversation with UDOT

personnel that would support a finding of notice by the Court.
It is significant that the two people that should know about the
events in the letter, if anyone did, both seemed to know nothing
about the letter.

The purported author, Fillmore, could not

recall anything about it (R.136).

Didericksen only knew that he

had a copy in the file. He didn't know who prepared the letter,
who typed it, who mailed it, or indeed, if it was in fact mailed
(R.137).

The Court may have the prerogative to admit the letter,

as a business record in light of the ruling in State ex rel.
Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977),

but to conclude that it

establishes the fact of notice to UDOT in the face of the
uncontroverted evidence which was before the Court that it had
never been received by UDOT is an abuse of discretion.

The

charge that UDOT has failed to marshall the evidence to support
the Court's finding of notice is not true.

The fact of notice to

UDOT rides or falls on the April 14, 1986 letter.

There simply

is no any other evidence to marshall concerning Finding of Fact
Number 21.

In this context UDOT submits that the admissability

of Exhibit 18-P is questionable under the guidelines found in
State v. Bertal, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), particularly the
6
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Fourth guideline which speaks to the circumstances surrounding
preparation of the document.

In this case, the circumstances

recounted above do not lend credence to the letter.
Procon accuses UDOT of urging strict compliance with
the contract requirement concerning notice of the contractor's
intent to claim added payment.

This charge is not quite correct.

UDOT is simply urging the position that it is entitled to notice
before it can be held accountable.

The April 14, 1986 letter is

deficient according to the contract specification as to details
of how the change will impact the contractor.

Such details can

be overlooked, but not the fact that no notice was ever received.
POINT II
THE RULING OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN THE
THORN CASE IS NOT CONTROLLING AS TO THE ISSUE
OF NOTICE.
Procon argues under Point II, Part B of its brief that
this case is "strikingly similar" to the Thorn case. (Thorn
Construction v. UDOT, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979)).

Procon also

asserts that UDOT "without specifically stating, requests that
this Court reject Thorn".

Procon is wrong on both counts. UDOT

in its opening brief was careful to point out that the Thorn
case, despite the fact that it deals with the issue of notice and
construes the same notice provision of the contract, is not
applicable here. In Thorn a verbal directive was issued by the
UDOT Engineer to Thorn's superintendant.

The directive required

the widening of a roadway and clearly involved added effort not
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

shown on the plans.

It was correct for the Court to conclude

that written notice was not required in that instance since the
effort required was beyond the scope of the plans. Here the
Engineer staked the waste area in a location that he felt was as
easily accessable to Procon as the plan specified location
(R.684-686).

He assumed that Procon would use the haul road,

which obviously had to be constructed to enable the roadway
embankment to be built, to haul the waste material to be
positioned (R. 693,694).

All of this "changed location" is

within the slope angle required by the plans in any event, and a
slope would have been required in order to support the placement
of material in the plan specified location, so he clearly assumed
that it would make no difference to Procon (R.658).

There was no

verbal dialogue concerning the change as there was in Thorn.

In

this type of fact situation if the contractor has a concern he
has a duty to so inform the Engineer in writing or forfeit any
claim if he does not. (See Roberts v. Security Trust & Savings
Bank, 196 Cal. 557, 238 P. 673 (1925); Bannon v. Jackson, 121
Tenn. 381, 117 S.W. 504 (1908) and Wunderlich Contracting v.
U.S.. 351 F2d 956, 173 Ct. CI. 180 (1965)).

UDOT contends that

Thorn is not applicable to the situation here but that State v.
Omega Painting, 463 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. App.1984) is applicable.
That case construes the same specification from the Indiana
Highway specifications as the one that is applicable in this
case.

Procon attempts to distinguish Omega by arguing that there
8
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was no evidence to show that there was a modification of the
contract whereas here the Court found that the waste area was
changed.

The problem is that the evidence shows that as far as

UDOT's Engineer is concerned that he viewed the plans as
requiring a slope which he staked and which accomodated all of
the waste material.
material change.

In his view there was no significant or

He therefore had no reason to suspect that the

contractor viewed the "change" otherwise; hence the need for
notice.

In Thorn, the Engineer knew that the work he directed

was an extra to the plan but no written notice was served by
Thorn and the Court took the position that it was not required.
In this case the Court has decided that there was a change in the
waste area location but that does not mean that the Engineer
recognized it as such or considered it a material or compensible
change.

It is therefore unfair to in effect judicially waive the

notice requirement.

The contract places the burden of notice on

the contractor and the court should respect that as a valid
contractual obligation.
There is a real question as to whether Procon was in fact
hurt by the so called "change" despite the finding of the Court
that the waste area was a "significant modification of the
plans".

Procon's field people did not seem concerned since they

noted the change in mid-March of 1986 and it was mid-April before
the disputed letter was dated, hardly an indication that the
contractor was put to a disadvantage.

The fact that Procon

9
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finally got around to writing a letter almost a month late is
evidence that they understood that they had a contractual
obligation to notify UDOT.

The problem is they had already

performed substantial work in accordance with the so-called
change and probably waived their right to seek relief.

This is

all the more reason that the court should have excluded the
letter and denied their claim.

The contract in fact requires

notice "before the contractor begins work".

In any event, it is

UDOT's position that Thorn is clearly distinguishable from the
facts of this case.
POINT III
UDOT WAS PREJUDICED BY LACK OF NOTICE AND DID
NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ASSERT SAME.
Under Point II, part C, of its brief, Procon makes the
incredible argument that even if there was no formal notice given
to UDOT that the claim of Procon is not barred because UDOT is
not prejudiced by lack of notice.

They argue that since UDOT

reviewed the claim of Procon on its merits that UDOT waived the
right to raise the issue of lack of formal notice. UDOT denies
that it waived its right to assert lack of notice. UDOT's
position has been clear from the beginning.

When the claim was

first presented, UDOT denied any liability and Norman Clyde's
testimony at trial to the effect that the only possible liability
which UDOT would have would be based on the added haul distance
of some of the material and would be about $3500 is the only
10
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concession UDOT ever made.

The fact that UDOT did not receive

Procon's letter of April 14, 1986 was not discovered until 1990
during trial preparation.

Therefore, it could not have waived

lack of notice until its Engineer was aware of the letter.

The

letter is referred to in Procon's claim and everyone who reviewed
the claim at UDOT headquarters apparently assumed that the letter
had been received in due course and that lack of notice was not
an issue. UDOT initially sought the assistance of the Rollins,
Brown & Gunnell engineering firm to aid in evaluating Procon's
claim before it responded to Procon.

Their analysis was focused

on the merits of the claim from an engineering and construction
standpoint.

They never discovered the lack of notice to UDOT

during their evaluation.

Lack of notice was raised at trial when

Exhibit 18-P was proferred.

By then it was recognized that the

letter had not been received prior to the termination of the
contract and that UDOT's Engineer was never informed that Procon
had any concern about the placement of the waste material as it
was staked (R.658,659).

It was pointed out to the Court that

Exhibit 18-P was not received by UDOT and objection to its
admittance as an exhibit at trial was initially sustained due to
lack of foundation.

To allege that UDOT was not disadvantaged by

lack of notice when Procon subsequently files a claim of over
$2,000,000 following termination of the contract, based largely
on the claim that Procon incurred extra costs because of an
alleged change in the waste area, is unbelievable.
11
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Procon's argument that UDOT's position regarding the
location of the waste area would have been the same, with or
without notice, is pure speculation and ignores the fact that
there were many options that UDOT could have exercised to reduce
or eliminate costs of the nature that Procon has alleged it
incurred, including the right to terminate the contract. Had
UDOT realized that Procon intended to seek such an enormous added
payment, there is no doubt that adjustments would have been made.
It does little good to speculate as to what would have happened;
but the point is, UDOT was not afforded the opportunity due to
lack of notice.

Procon's assertion is based on the testimony of

UDOT's engineer, Hugh Kirkham, that he did not agree that there
had been a change in the waste area (R. 671, 684) . Kirkham
explained his reasons for said assertion in further testimony at
trial (R.685-686).

All of this line of questioning is remote and

speculative as the trial judge recognized in sustaining an
objection to that effect during questioning by counsel for Procon
(R. 684) . The bottom line is, so to speak, that UDOT was
entitled to notice that Procon intended to seek more
compensation, and the record fails to demonstrate that UDOT ever
received notice during performance of the contract.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision to admit Exhibit 18-P as a
business record after testimony failed to establish an adequate
foundation for its admittance otherwise is error in the context
12
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of the facts of this case. The letter was meant to convey notice
that Procon intended to seek added payment for work which UDOT's
Engineer considered to be encompassed within contract
requirements and no more costly than had the contract specified
location been used.

UDOT is clearly entitled to notice under

contract provisions and the record at trial demonstrates that
notice was not received by UDOT nor was it waived either
expressly or by implication.

There was no verbal direction to

Procon unlike the facts in the Thorn case, and the so called
"change" was actually encompassed within the terms of the
contract so the facts in the view of UDOT's Engineer did not
excuse the written notice requirement as they did in Thorn.

As

to what might have happened had UDOT received notice is simply
speculation; but it is safe to say that UDOT would never have
agreed to pay anything remotely near the $507,300 which the trial
judge awarded.

Finding of Fact Number 21 to the effect that UDOT

was on notice of Procon's intention to claim added payment for a
change in the location of the waste area is not supported by the
evidence.

UDOT has in fact marshalled all the evidence that

would support such a finding and it begins and ends with the
letter of April 14, 1986 which was dated nearly thirty days late,
deficient in all respects, not shown to have been received by
UDOT, and which should never have been admitted into evidence.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and
dismiss this part of Procon's claim.
13
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UDOT seeks relief as outlined in Section II, III, and
IV of its original brief in addition to the relief outlined in
Section I of its original brief as amplified in this Reply Brief,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

• p day of July, 1993

FORD
Assistant- Attorney General
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